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OPEN ENROLLMENT: WHAT’S IN THE
BEST INTEREST OF WISCONSIN
STUDENTS, FAMILIES, AND PUBLIC
SCHOOLS?
In 2011, the Wisconsin legislature greatly expanded Wisconsin’s open
enrollment program by lengthening the regular application window and
creating a year-round alternative application procedure with a vague and
undefined best interest of the pupil standard. This Comment addresses
the Wisconsin Open Enrollment Program in the larger context of school
choice, its recent amendments, and the resulting obstacles to ensure equal
educational opportunities for all Wisconsin students. It suggests that the
continued expansion of open enrollment without sufficiently defined
standards undermines local control and opts to further a handful of
individual students at the expense of the collective statewide population.
Further, this Comment advocates for a return to a more limited and
defined version of open enrollment and alternatively proposes a
balancing test by which to weigh the best interests of each student against
the administrative, financial, and equitable implications of open
enrollment that impact the effective operation of public schools.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Private investigators, criminal prosecution, and amnesty programs—
once distant topics from public education—are increasingly seen
nationwide in school residency disputes. In California, roughly 300
families came forward after a San Francisco school district offered
1
amnesty to families unlawfully enrolled in a high performing district.
Additionally, an Ohio mother was convicted of a felony and sentenced
to five years in prison after falsifying records and enrolling her kids in a
2
highly-ranked neighboring district. Similarly, a homeless mother in
Connecticut faced charges for first-degree larceny and up to twenty
years in prison for stealing roughly $16,000 in education by registering
her son in her babysitter’s school district rather than the mother’s last
3
known residence, a “significantly poorer urban district.”
An administrator of a high performing district recognized that “[a]t
4
the root of it all [is] people who wanted the best for their children.”
One parent who was prosecuted for enrolling her daughter in a better,
neighboring district stated, “[l]ike any parent, I was just looking out for
5
my daughter.”
Another commentator explained that these cases
6
demonstrate “how desperately parents want access to better schools.”

1. Kantele Franko, Kelley Williams-Bolar Case Highlights Schools’ Efforts to ID Fake
Student Addresses, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 2011, 9:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.c
om/2011/02/25/schools-boost-efforts-to-_n_828275.html.
2. The mother was sentenced to five years in prison, is on probation for three years, and
must perform eighty hours of community service. Douglas Stanglin, Ohio Mom Jailed for
Falsely Enrolling Kids in Better School, USA TODAY (Feb. 26, 2011, 2:01 PM),
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2011/01/ohio-mom-jailed-forenrolling-kids-in-better-school-district/1#.UODavLbR07C.
3. See Stephanie Reitz, Tanya McDowell, Conn. Mom, Pleads Not Guilty in School
Enrollment Case, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 27, 2011, 2:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.co
m/2011/04/27/tanya-mcdowell-not-guilty-plea_n_854377.html; see also Peter Applebome, In a
Mother’s Case, Reminders of Educational Inequalities, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, at A18.
4. Franko, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Stephanie Reitz, Kelley Williams-Bolar, Tanya McDowell Cases Raise Fairness
Questions, HUFFINGTON POST (May 10, 2011, 4:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
05/10/school-residency-cases_n_860107.html.
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Yet, rather than address the inherently inequitable school finance
7
system based largely on property taxes, the primary response to this
disparity has been to provide students with educational options through
the expansion of school choice programs.
Wisconsin, in particular, has been at the forefront of the nationwide
school choice debate. In 1990, Wisconsin enacted the first governmentfunded private voucher program in the country, the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program (MPCP), which provides governmental funding directly
to families in the form of a voucher that may be used to pay tuition at a
8
participating private school. Initially limited to 1,000 students from
9
families with income at or below 175% of the federal poverty level, the
MPCP has expanded to families with income at or below 300% of the
federal poverty level and over 110 participating private schools with
10
25,820 students in the 2013–2014 academic year.

7. See Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional
Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1330 (1992) (noting that states largely fund public education
through local property taxes, which “results in greater expenditures on education in those
areas where property values are highest”); see also infra notes 71, 82 (noting that the school
finance system based on property taxes in most states has been consistently upheld as
constitutional at both the state and federal levels). However, a few state supreme courts have
declared that the states’ system of financing public education that relies heavily on local
property taxes discriminates against the poor and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d
806, 815–16 (Ariz. 1994); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) (recognizing “that
the right to an education in our public schools is a fundamental interest which cannot be
conditioned on wealth”); Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334
(Wyo. 1980).
8. JOHN F. WITTE, THE MARKET APPROACH TO EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
AMERICA’S FIRST VOUCHER PROGRAM 3 (2000); SUSAN MITCHELL, WIS. POLICY
RESEARCH INST., HOW SCHOOL CHOICE ALMOST DIED IN WISCONSIN 4 (Vol. 12, No. 6
1999) (describing the Milwaukee voucher program as a “national laboratory for school choice
and its impact on families”); see also Peter M. Kimball, Comment, Opening the Door to
School Choice in Wisconsin: Is Agostini v. Felton the Key?, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 843, 847–48
(1998).
9. Kimball, supra note 8, at 848.
10. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, MPCP FACTS AND FIGURES FOR 2013–2014
(2013), available at sms.dpi.wi.gov/files/sms/doc/mpcp_14fnf_2013_11.doc; PUB. POLICY
FORUM, SIGNIFICANT GROWTH IN SCHOOL CHOICE: MORE SCHOOLS, MORE STUDENTS,
FEWER LIMITS ON INCOME ELIGIBILITY 1, 3 (Vol. 100, No. 1 2012) [hereinafter SIGNIFICANT
GROWTH IN SCHOOL CHOICE], available at http://publicpolicyforum.org/research/significantgrowth-school-choice-more-schools-more-students-fewer-limits-income-eligibility. The
MPCP is now in its twenty-third year, yet it has failed to produce expected gains in student
academic achievement. See PUB. POLICY FORUM, CHOICE SCHOOLS HAVE MUCH IN
COMMON WITH MPS, INCLUDING STUDENT PERFORMANCE 1 (Vol. 101 No. 1 2013),
available at http://publicpolicyforum.org/sites/default/files/2013VoucherBrief-Clarified_1.pdf
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A few years after the creation of the MPCP, Wisconsin launched one
of the first statewide inter-district open enrollment programs in 1997
that allow students to attend any public school, regardless of the
11
student’s residentially zoned district. During the first year of open
enrollment in Wisconsin, there were 2,464 student transfers and a total
of $9.6 million in per-pupil funding transferred from one school district
12
to another. Fast-forward fourteen years and the numbers climbed to
41,562 student transitions with a total of $242.8 million in funds
13
transferred between districts in the 2012–2013 academic year.
Although open enrollment has received less attention than its school
14
choice counterpart—voucher programs —the constitutional, financial,
and equitable concerns are similarly profound and, perhaps, of greater
15
significance given the statewide scope.
This Comment will address recent amendments to Wisconsin’s open
enrollment statute that greatly expand the scope of the program and
carry significant implications for local school districts, and consequently,

(noting that MPCP student proficiency rates on state standardized exams “tend to be slightly
below the proficiency rates of students in MPS”); Alan J. Borsuk, Choice May Not Improve
Schools, Study Says: Report on MPS Comes from Longtime Supporter of Plan, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, Oct. 24, 2007, at 1A. Despite these questionable academic results, “[i]f MPCP
were a Wisconsin Public School District, it would be the third largest in the state, behind
Milwaukee and Madison districts.” SIGNIFICANT GROWTH IN SCHOOL CHOICE, supra at 3.
Ironically, the MPCP initially passed constitutional muster on the basis of its limited
applicability and experimental nature, although it has since survived multiple state
constitutional challenges. Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 853–54, 578 N.W.2d 602, 611
(1998) (holding that the MPCP does not violate the Establishment Clause); Davis v. Grover,
166 Wis. 2d 501, 530, 480 N.W.2d 460, 474 (1992) (holding that the MPCP does not violate the
state Uniformity Clause because participating schools do not constitute “district schools”
within the meaning of the state constitution despite public funding).
11. See LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, OPEN ENROLLMENT PROGRAM TRANSFER
AMOUNT ALTERNATIVES 3 (2011) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU ON OPEN
ENROLLMENT].
12. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, PUBLIC SCHOOL OPEN ENROLLMENT BY THE
NUMBERS (2013), available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/files/sms/pdf/oe_psoe_at_a_glance.pdf.
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 22, 25 and accompanying text.
15. Deven Carlson et al., The Determinants of Interdistrict Open Enrollment Flows:
Evidence from Two States, 33 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 76, 76 (2011)
(“Interdistrict open enrollment is the most widely used form of school choice in the United
States.”); Lorna Jimerson, Interdistrict Open Enrollment: The Benign Choice?, 76 CLEARING
HOUSE 16, 16 (2002) (noting that open enrollment appears to be a “relatively benign policy in
the midst of frenzied debate about other choice options” and that it “generates meager
debate in the public arena”). See generally infra Part III (discussing the constitutional,
financial, and equitable implications of inter-district open enrollment in Wisconsin).
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Wisconsin families.
Part II of this Comment will discuss open
enrollment in the larger context of school choice, including arguments
for and against, as well as the state and federal constitutional
framework. Part III will detail the Wisconsin Open Enrollment
Program in the wake of the 2011 legislative amendments, with an
emphasis on the new statutory best interest exception that effectively
17
permits year-round open enrollment transfers.
The discussion
highlights that the recent expansion of open enrollment creates
challenges for local school districts to effectively plan space availability,
stabilize budgets, and ensure equitable educational services for all
students.
Part III then draws attention to a key lobbying force behind the
legislative amendments—the for-profit, virtual education industry—and
notes how the expansion of open enrollment significantly advanced the
rise of virtual education in Wisconsin, an industry that has proven
largely ineffective. Finally, Part IV advocates reigning in the continued
expansion of open enrollment. This Comment does not suggest
eliminating open enrollment in Wisconsin public schools. Rather, it
advocates for a return to a more controlled and limited version of the
program that existed prior to the 2011 amendments by repealing the
best interest exception. In the alternative, Part IV proposes a balancing
test by which to weigh the best interests of each student against the
administrative, financial, and equitable implications of open enrollment
that impact the effective operations of public schools. This Comment
suggests that year-round open enrollment without sufficiently defined
standards undermines local control and operates against the best
interest of all children in Wisconsin.
II. SCHOOL CHOICE: OPEN ENROLLMENT IN CONTEXT
A. Unraveling School Choice
School choice has become a “cornerstone of federal educational
policy,” yet many do not understand the basic framework, much less its

16. See generally Memorandum from Anne Sappenfield, Senior Staff Attorney, Wis.
Legislative Council (Feb. 17, 2012).
17. The best interest exception permits year-round open enrollment when it is in the
best interest of the child. See infra Part II.A–B.
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18

nuances and implications. The word “choice” is a political goldmine as
it appeals to a fundamental democratic value—the right to choose—
19
while being apolitical on its face. Even though the inherent ambiguity
20
may be useful politically, it has caused much confusion. Nonetheless,
the various educational arrangements under the umbrella of school
choice can be boiled down to two primary categories: choices within the
21
public school system and choices between public and private schools.
Private school choice programs, such as vouchers and tuition tax credits,
have raised significant constitutional concerns under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment because they permit students to attend
22
private—and often religious—schools with public resources.
Additionally, voucher programs are largely confined to urban cities with
23
a high concentration of poverty and are limited to low-income families.
On the other hand, public school choice options such as magnet
schools, charter schools, post-secondary enrollment, and open

18. Chia-Lin Hsieh & Jianping Shen, Is School Choice a Mechanism for Sustaining
Change? Implications from a National Survey, 75 CLEARING HOUSE 88, 88 (2001).
19. Angela Slate Rawls, Comment, Eliminating Options Through Choice: Another Look
at Private School Vouchers, 50 EMORY L.J. 363, 363 (2001); Kimball, supra note 8, at 843
(quoting Tommy Thompson, Governor of Wis., State of the State Address, Address Before
the Joint Convention (Jan. 29, 1997), in SENATE J., 1997–1998 SESSION, at 54, 57).
20. See generally Kim K. Metcalf & Polly A. Tait, Free Market Policies and Public
Education: What Is the Cost of Choice?, 81 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 65, 67 (1999) (noting the
“tremendous confusion that exists over the effects” of school choice); Angela G. Smith,
Public School Choice and Open Enrollment: Implications for Education, Desegregation, and
Equity, 74 NEB. L. REV. 255, 275 (1995) (“[T]he vagueness of the concept of choice enhances
its political appeal because the term can be construed to mean various things.”).

21. Philip T.K. Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of Educational Choice: Can the
Polemic of Legal Problems Be Overcome?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 10–24 (1993) (providing an
overview of public and private school choice); Hsieh & Shen, supra note 18, at 88.
22. WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, SCHOOL CHOICE IN WISCONSIN 1, 10
(1995); see also R. KENNETH GODWIN & FRANK R. KEMERER, SCHOOL CHOICE
TRADEOFFS: LIBERTY, EQUITY, AND DIVERSITY 7 (2002).
23. ROSLYN ARLIN MICKELSON ET AL., SCHOOL CHOICE AND SEGREGATION BY
RACE, CLASS, AND ACHIEVEMENT 9 (2008), available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/CHO
ICE-08-Mickelson-FINAL-EG043008.pdf (noting that voucher programs to date have been
targeted at “low-income students in urban schools”). However, voucher programs are
beginning to expand. SIGNIFICANT GROWTH IN SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 10, at 1. In
2011, amendments to the MPCP contained a provision that expanded school choice programs
in cities outside of Milwaukee, which led to the creation of the Parental Private School
Choice Program in Racine and a small statewide version in various cities. Id. The program in
Racine allows 250 students to attend; within the first year, eight schools enrolled 228 students.
Id. at 11.
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24

enrollment allow parents to shop among various public school options.
In contrast to voucher programs that have been steeped in controversy
25
for decades, open enrollment programs have not been as extensively
26
examined and have received significantly less attention nationwide.
However, as of 2013, forty-six states had enacted some form of an open
27
enrollment policy, most of which are statewide and mandatory, as
opposed to the more limited and largely regional private school choice
28
voucher programs. Because open enrollment impacts a substantially
larger segment of the populace than voucher programs, its implications
in the school choice debate should not be overlooked.
Although the structure of open enrollment programs vary from state
29
to state, there are two primary forms implemented across the country:
intra-district and inter-district, which may be voluntary or mandatory
30
programs. Intra-district open enrollment programs permit students to
31
attend any school within their resident school district, space permitting.
On the other hand, inter-district programs permit students to cross
school district lines and attend any public school, even if it is outside of
the district the student is residentially zoned to attend, so long as the
24. KIM SHEANE & LOUANN BIERLEIN, OPEN ENROLLMENT/EDUCATIONAL CHOICE:
A NATIONAL REVIEW 8–10 (1991) (describing characteristics of charter schools, magnet
schools, and post-secondary enrollment programs); see also DAVID DODENHOFF, WIS.
POLICY RESEARCH INST., THE LIMITS OF PARENT-DRIVEN REFORM 5–6 (Vol. 20, No. 8
2007), available at http://www.wispolitics.com/1006/Vol20no8.pdf; Kimball, supra note 8, at
843. See generally WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, supra note 22.
25. GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 57 (explaining that the “most heated
debates over choice” center around voucher programs and describing in particular the
controversy surrounding the Milwaukee Public School Voucher Program); David M. Welsch
et al., An Examination of Inter-District Public School Transfers in Wisconsin, 29 ECON.
EDUC. REV. 126, 127–28 (2010). See generally Greg Todd, Comment, “Fully Participating”
Voucher Programs and the Wisconsin Template: A Brick or a Breach in the Wall of ChurchState Separation?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 710 (2000) (analyzing the constitutionality of
Milwaukee voucher program).
26. See Carlson et al., supra note 15, at 76 (“[I]nterdistrict open enrollment [has] largely
flown below the radar screen of scholars and policy analysts.”); Welsch et al., supra note 25.
27. Alabama, the District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia have
not enacted an open enrollment policy. See EDUC. COMM’N. OF THE STATES, OPEN
ENROLLMENT: 50-STATE REPORT (2013), available at http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/report.aspx?
id=268.
28. Alan Wolfe, The Irony of School Choice: Liberals, Conservatives, and the New
Politics of Race, in SCHOOL CHOICE: THE MORAL DEBATE 31, 34 (Alan Wolfe ed., 2003).
29. Jimerson, supra note 15, at 16.
30. EDUC. COMM’N. OF THE STATES, supra note 27. Some states have adopted a
mixture of both inter- and intra-district enrollment. See Smith, supra note 20, at 266–68.
31. Smith, supra note 20, at 266.
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nonresident school has space available and the parents comply with the
32
requisite procedures.
For example, the Wisconsin Open Enrollment Program, further
detailed in Part III, operates statewide and requires a parent to submit
an application to the school district the student wishes to attend during a
33
specified time frame, unless the student satisfies one of seven
34
exceptions. The participating nonresident school district must then
accept potential students on a random basis using certain acceptance
criteria, although preference may be given to students and siblings of
35
students who are already attending the nonresident district.
The
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI) then transfers a
specified amount of student aid to the nonresident, receiving school
36
district. Intra-district programs are significantly less problematic as
compared to inter-district programs because the district revenue stays
37
put and other issues of equity are of lesser concern. As a result, this
Comment focuses on the implications of the inter-district open
enrollment program in Wisconsin.
B. Arguments For and Against Open Enrollment
Because of the ambiguity surrounding school choice, it is often
38
appealing to both political parties, although for different reasons.
While some conservatives consider the free market the “silver bullet” to
improve schools, some liberals view school choice as a vehicle for social
39
equality. In general, advocates of open enrollment favor the injection
32. Hsieh & Shen, supra note 18, at 88; see also WIS. ADMIN. CODE PI § 36.03 (Sept.
2012); Elaine M. McGillivray, Comment, The New Minnesota Miracle?: A Critique of Open
Enrollment in Minnesota’s Public Schools, 11 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 105, 107 (1990).
33. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(3)(a)(1) (2011–2012).
34. Id. § 118.51(3m)(a); see also infra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
35. Id. § 118.51(3)(a)(2); see also infra note 111 (noting that students may begin
attending a nonresident school district before the open enrollment application has been
approved or denied).
36. See infra note 158 and accompanying text (noting that the costs associated with each
student transfer for the 2011–2012 academic year was $6,867 per student).
37. See infra Part III.G (discussing equitable concerns of inter-district open enrollment).
38. JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF THE MARKET
METAPHOR 21 (1994) (“[G]iven the combination of potent appeal and fundamental
ambiguity, it is not surprising that choice is a label simultaneously pursued by the political
right and left alike.”).
39. MICKELSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 3–4; see also McGillivray, supra note 32, at 114
(“‘[Liberals support choice also]. Many are calling choice ‘empowering,’ a way within the
public school system to extend to all the freedom wealthy families have always had: choosing
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of the free market into public education to increase competition and,
40
ultimately, improve the quality of educational services. Under this
market theory approach that makes room for consumer choices, the
overall education system is enhanced because schools are forced to
41
either improve or shut down, as opposed to the public school system
42
that provides “no incentive to improve.” Instead, choice schools must
43
“work to keep their customers,” unlike the traditional, monopolistic
public schools that are “complacent, lethargic, inefficient, and
44
unresponsive to the needs of most students.” In addition to injecting
the competitive spirit of the free market, open enrollment empowers
45
parents to take a more active role in their child’s education, which
46
proponents argue ultimately improves student performance. Not only
does the program induce systemic change, but it can also “rescue
children from bad schools” by providing access to high performing
47
schools that would otherwise be inaccessible.
In contrast, opponents often adhere to the equity theory, which
criticizes the commoditization of public education and argues that a
market-based approach wrongfully transforms public education into a

where and how their children will be educated.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Kathleen
Sylvester, Schools of Choice: A Path to Educational Quality or ‘Tiers of Inequity’?,
GOVERNING, July 1989, at 50–51)).
40. GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 19–23 (explaining the arguments in favor of
school choice); see also Smith, supra note 20, at 277.
41. Smith, supra note 20, at 277–84 (discussing the market theory versus the equity
theory). Research conducted in Wisconsin indicates that districts that lose students
experience slightly higher test scores in the following academic year. David M. Welsch &
David M. Zimmer, Do Student Migrations Affect School Performance? Evidence from
Wisconsin’s Inter-District Public School Program, 31 ECON. EDUC. REV. 195, 206 (2012).
Although the evidence may suggest the competitive effect of open enrollment works, Welsch
and Zimmer note that the result may stem from the departure of low-performing students.
Id. at 205.
42. EMILY VAN DUNK & ANNELIESE M. DICKMAN, SCHOOL CHOICE AND THE
QUESTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY: THE MILWAUKEE EXPERIENCE 1 (2003).
43. See id. at 1–2; Dodenhoff, supra note 24, at 4; Daniel, supra note 21, at 9–24
(providing an overview of public and private school choice); see also Hsieh & Shen, supra
note 18, at 88.
44. Daniel, supra note 21, at 25.
45. See McGillivray, supra note 32, at 109–10.
46. GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 20 (noting that choice encourages parents
to become “consumers of education rather than targets of social policy” and that research
indicates greater involvement of parents increases student academic success).
47. SHEANE & BIERLEIN, supra note 24, at 1, 8–10.
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product, where some students benefit and other students do not.
Under this approach, school choice improperly leads to a form of social
Darwinism that treats public schools like supermarkets, where parents
and students are now customers that dictate the success and failure of
49
public schools.
Except the system compromises the quality of
education received by those students in the losing school districts, rather
than some inadequate commodity on the shelves of the local grocery
50
store. Opponents of school choice further argue that business cannot
serve as a model for public schools because the nature of public schools
“stress[es] collective goods and collective values,” unlike the nature of
the free market, which furthers the individual at the expense of the
51
collective. Further, there appears to be a lack of evidence that students
who attend choice public schools experience enhanced academic
52
achievement. Other criticisms of open enrollment include the loss of
53
54
local control, increased social and racial segregation, and equitable
48. Smith, supra note 20, at 279; see also infra notes 168–70 and accompanying text
(explaining situations where open enrollment creates “more losers than winners” throughout
Wisconsin).
49. GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 38 (explaining that parents who did not
participate in school choice programs “did not see education as a ‘commodity’ over which
they could exercise power as consumers”); Patrick E. Mascia, Comment, Open Enrollment:
Social Darwinism at Work, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 443 (1990).
50. As the California Supreme Court noted, “[u]nequal education, then, leads to
unequal job opportunities, disparate income, and handicapped ability to participate in the
social, cultural, and political activity of our society.” Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1257
(Cal. 1971) (quoting San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 479 P.2d 669, 676 (Cal.
1971)).
51. GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 25; see also Daniel, supra note 21, at 26.
52. Jimerson, supra note 15, at 19 (“[N]o evidence conclusively proves that the act of
choosing improves students’ academic achievement.”).
53. McGillivray, supra note 32, at 123–27.
54. Although desegregation reached a peak at the end of the 1980s, the last two
decades—since the implementation and widespread adoption of school choice—have seen
increased re-segregation by race and socioeconomic status. MICKELSON ET AL., supra note
23, at 6–7. “In fact, open enrollment plans allow more advantaged students to transfer to
relatively whiter, more affluent school systems, thereby exacerbating race and [socioeconomic
status] inequality between districts.” Id. at 12; see also Jimerson, supra note 15, at 17 (“Most
studies . . . indicate that choice causes increased stratification along ethnic and socioeconomic
lines.” (citing BRIAN P. GILL ET AL., RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY: WHAT WE KNOW AND
WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW ABOUT VOUCHERS AND CHARTER SCHOOLS 181 (2001)));
Cynthia Boyd, Minnesota’s New ‘White Flight’: School Open-Enrollment Program, MINNPOST
(Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.minnpost.com/community-sketchbook/2013/01/minnesota-s-newwhite-flight-school-open-enrollment-program (noting that the state open enrollment program
has resulted in increased racial segregation and the districts gaining students from open
enrollment are “predominantly white districts becoming whiter”).
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concerns that address whether it is fundamentally the nature of public
education to pit school districts against one another, thereby creating
55
“winning” and “losing” school districts.
The two opposing theoretical approaches to open enrollment
implicate a fundamental clash between the purposes of public
56
education. Under the market theory, the purpose of education is to
57
benefit the individual, whereas the equity theory seeks to benefit
58
society at large. One commentator noted that “[w]hen it comes to
education policy, Americans want it all,” but when faced with the tradeoff between freedom of choice and equality of opportunity “Americans
59
will nearly always choose freedom.” Accordingly, the expansion of
school choice continues to be an attractive alternative for parents who
are disillusioned with their children’s current public school placements.
C. Why Parents Choose
A comprehensive review of open enrollment requires an inquiry into
the basic question of what motivates parent decisions to transfer
students from one public school district to another. Not surprisingly,
60
students transfer to districts that have higher test scores, have higher
61
62
median income, have higher academic standards, and are generally in
63
safer neighborhoods. A recent in-depth study in Wisconsin concluded
that parents are attracted to districts that have high achievement, high
55. McGillivray, supra note 32, at 126.
56. GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 13–14 (“Publicly funded education creates
an inherent tension between the right of parents to transmit their culture to their children and
the right of society to use the educational system to produce the values that society believes
are critical to its continuance.”).
57. Smith, supra note 20, at 279–80.
58. Id.
59. GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 1 (“We demand better test score results for
all students, greater equality of opportunity, respect for diversity, preparation for good
citizenship, efficiency, regulatory accountability, the development of autonomy in students,
and preparation for jobs in a postindustrial society. But it is impossible to maximize
educational performance in all these areas at the same time.”); Wolfe, supra note 28, at 42–43
(explaining that overall, Americans value freedom more than equality).
60. Randall Reback, Demand (and Supply) in an Inter-District Public School Choice
Program, 27 ECON. EDUC. REV. 402, 403 (2008).
61. See Richard Fossey, Open Enrollment in Massachusetts: Why Families Choose, 16
EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 320, 324 (1994).
62. DAVID J. ARMOR & BRETT M. PEISER, COMPETITION IN EDUCATION: A CASE
STUDY OF INTERDISTRICT CHOICE 122–23 (1997).
63. See GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 22, at 9.
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spending, more extracurricular activities, and a low percentage of
64
minorities. The study also concluded that students are transferring
from districts that have high property values, but low tax rates,
“suggest[ing] that families may avoid paying higher taxes while at the
65
same time benefitting from the higher spending on education.”
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that convenience, parent perception of
the school, and parent dissatisfaction heavily contribute to open
66
enrollment choices.
Other reasons include ease of transportation,
67
The
proximity to a parent’s workplace, and program shopping.
underlying motivations for district transfers provide a useful vantage
point from which to analyze the recent amendments to the Wisconsin
Open Enrollment Program, as will be discussed in Part III.
D. Federal and State Constitutional Context
While open enrollment has received less attention than voucher
programs, the constitutional implications are similarly profound. At
both the federal and state levels, there seems to be a disconnect between
the supportive rhetoric and the practical realities within education law,
which significantly impacts the practical implementation of open
enrollment. Despite the famous language from Brown v. Board of
Education that “education is perhaps the most important function of
68
state and local governments,” the United States Supreme Court held
that education is not a federal fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution in San Antonio Independent
64. Welsch et al., supra note 25, at 132–36; see also GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note
22, at 8 (“Research on magnet schools and open enrollment programs shows that unless a
choice policy includes provisions that prevent it, white parents will choose schools that enroll
a lower percentage of minority students than the school their children left.”).
65. Welsch et al., supra note 25, at 132.
66. Amy Hetzner, Higher Spending, Test Scores Attract More Students, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Sept. 29, 2009, at B1 (citing Stockbridge School District Superintendent Dave
Moscinski, who noted that “perception plays a key role in school district choices, whether that
is based on actual performance or not” and parent Stacy Juhl, who utilizes open enrollment
based on convenience); see also Sara Kuhl, Open Enrollment Makes Schools More
Competitive, Study Says, U. OF WISCONSIN-WHITEWATER (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.uww.e
du/news/archive/2012-02-open-enrollment (noting that parent dissatisfaction is likely a key
reason for student transfers).
67. Kuhl, supra note 66 (“If a student is very interested in robotics, but your district
doesn’t have a robotics program, it makes sense to change districts.” (quoting David Welsch,
Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
68. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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69

School District v. Rodriguez. In addition, although the Supreme Court
recognizes public schools as a matter of “supreme importance” and the
“most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system
70
of government,” Rodriguez held that the Texas school finance system
based on property taxes, which resulted in wealth inequality between
districts, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
71
Amendment. Thus, state action as it relates to the financing of public
education must merely be rationally related to legitimate state
72
purposes, whereas a complete deprivation of education is subjected to
73
strict scrutiny and more likely to be deemed unconstitutional.
Although there is no federal fundamental right to education, state
74
constitutions have taken different approaches on the issue.
For
example, Wisconsin has defined education as a fundamental right
75
subject to strict scrutiny pursuant to Article X, Section 3 of the state’s
constitution, which states:
The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of
district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable;
and such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to
all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years; and no sectarian
76
instruction shall be allowed therein.
Even though education is a fundamental right, Wisconsin case law
has broadly interpreted the requirement that district schools be as
69. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“Public education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the
Constitution.”).
70. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230
(1963) (Brennan J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)).
71. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28 (noting that the school finance system did not operate to
the disadvantage of a suspect class).
72. Id. at 40.
73. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (“We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our
Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which
our social order rests.”). Plyler involved the deprivation of public school funding for
undocumented children. Id. at 205, 221.
74. See, e.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973) (en banc) (interpreting
ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 6); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971); Horton v.
Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977) (interpreting CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1). But see,
e.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017 (Colo. 1982) (interpreting COLO.
CONST. art. IX, § 2 and holding that education is not a fundamental right).
75. Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 567, 579–80, 247 N.W.2d 141, 149, 155 (1976).
76. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 (emphasis added).

MALUGADE FINAL (6-30-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

826

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/2/2014 5:23 PM

[97:3

nearly uniform as practicable—known as the Uniformity Clause—to
provide “not a ceiling but a floor” of “certain minimal educational
77
opportunities.” The Uniformity Clause has been interpreted to refer
to the “character of instruction” provided in Wisconsin public schools
78
rather than the “method of forming school districts.” However, the
Uniformity Clause does require “[a]n equal opportunity for a sound
basic education . . . that will equip students for their roles as citizens and
79
enable them to succeed economically and personally.” While open
80
enrollment implicitly assumes public schools are not uniform, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that “absolute uniformity” is not
81
required. As a result, any disparity resulting from the school finance
system based largely on property taxes was held not to violate the
Wisconsin Constitution, so long as each school district is adequately or
82
minimally funded.
83
Similar to the rationale in Rodriguez, a rational basis standard of
review is applied to school finance mechanisms in Wisconsin because
the rights implicated “are premised upon spending disparities and not
84
upon a complete denial of educational opportunity.” In Vincent v.
77. Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 61, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388 (quoting Davis
v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 639, 480 N.W.2d 460, 474 (1992); Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d
835, 894–95, 578 N.W.2d 602, 628 (1998)).
78. Id. ¶ 31 (quoting State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 290, 221 N.W. 860, 862
(1928)); Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 520, 436 N.W.2d 568, 589 (1989) (Bablitch, J.
dissenting) (“Character of instruction has been more recently expressed as ‘services,
procedures, opportunities or rules’ provided in district schools.” (quoting Zweifel v. Joint
Dist. No. 1, Belleville, 76 Wis. 2d 648, 653, 251 N.W.2d 822, 824 (1977))).
79. Vincent, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 51.
80. McGillivray, supra note 32, at 127 (“Open enrollment can be construed as an
admission that schools are not uniform.”).
81. Vincent, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 68.
82. Id. (“[A] school finance system that uniformly funds school districts to provide a
basic level of education is constitutional.”).
83. Compare San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (“[N]o
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to
acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process.”), with Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971)
(finding a fundamental right to education and holding that the school financing system based
on property taxes was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
84. Vincent, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 83 (quoting Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 498, 436
N.W.2d 568, 580 (1989)) (“We carefully distinguish between the fundamental right to an
equal opportunity for a sound basic education under art. X, § 3 and the wealth-based
arguments the Petitioners make. In other words, the fundamental right to an equal
opportunity for a sound basic education does not rest on any classification based on
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Voight, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that there was insufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the basic education afforded to students in
property-poor school districts was inferior to the education received by
85
students in property-rich districts. Ultimately, the court noted that
there was no proof of “poor standardized test scores, college entrance
86
rates, or the like.” In the end, “[m]erely showing disparity of the
financial resources among school districts is not enough in this state to
prove a lack of equal opportunity for a sound basic
education . . . . Wisconsin requires districts to fulfill a constitutional
87
minimum educational offering, not a maximum.”
In light of the
constitutional minimum guarantee, local districts are able to raise and
88
expend funds above and beyond the threshold required by the state.
Thus, significant wealth disparity between school districts has been
given the rubber stamp of approval by the federal government and
many state governments, such as Wisconsin, by merely affording
rational review, rather than strict scrutiny.
If Rodriguez or Vincent were revisited today, it is possible, and
89
likely, that the outcomes would be different. One commentator noted
that the Rodriguez decision “is more like a fragile scale that is quite
90
capable of being tipped” due to strong dissenting opinions that

wealth. . . . Since the Petitioners’ argument rests on wealth-based classifications and not
classifications based on art. X, § 3, we apply the rational basis test.”); see also Rodriguez, 411
U.S. at 23–24.
85. Vincent, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 72.
86. Id.
87. Id. ¶ 71. Compare id. (noting that financial disparity is not sufficient to violate the
Wisconsin guarantee of a free public education), with Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 297–
98 (N.J. 1973) (holding a public school financing system based largely on property taxes
unconstitutional because it failed to satisfy state constitutional guarantee of a “thorough and
efficient” free public education).
88. Vincent, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 59 (“[T]he constitution does not require districts to have
uniform revenue-raising capacity.”); see also Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 572, 247 N.W.2d
141, 151 (1976).
89. See Timothy D. Lynch, Note, Education as a Fundamental Right: Challenging the
Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 953, 994 (1998) (“Although the degree
of unequal educational opportunities may have been remarkably different in 1973 when
Rodriguez was decided, today it is clear that many of this nation’s poorest children are
learning in inadequate educational systems that have failed to teach them the most basic
subjects.”); Erik LeRoy, Comment, The Egalitarian Roots of the Education Article of the
Wisconsin Constitution: Old History, New Interpretation, Buse v. Smith Criticized, 1981 WIS.
L. REV. 1325, 1332–33 (1981) (“Rodriguez is a widely criticized decision.”).
90. Lynch, supra note 89, at 992.
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“sharply undercut the [majority opinion’s] strength.” Moreover, recent
research on open enrollment in Wisconsin outlined in Part III.C
suggests that parents have their children transfer schools precisely
because of “poor standardized test scores, college entrance rates, or the
92
like.” As the United States Supreme Court recognized, “[t]he inability
to read and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic
education each and every day of his life” and take an “inestimable toll
of that deprivation on the social economic, intellectual, and
93
psychological well-being of the individual.” Until existing case law is
revisited, the legislature is best suited to address the disparities by
crafting legislation that adequately protects the Wisconsin state
94
guarantee of a uniform and free public education. Unfortunately, the
expansion of Wisconsin’s inter-district open enrollment program fails to
provide the necessary protections.
III. THE NEW (BUT NOT IMPROVED) WISCONSIN OPEN ENROLLMENT
PROGRAM
A. Nuts and Bolts: The Wisconsin Open Enrollment Program
In 2011, the Wisconsin legislature greatly expanded the scope of
open enrollment by lengthening the regular application window and by
creating an alternative application procedure that may be used at any
95
time during the year. Under the prior law, there was a three-week
timeframe to apply for open enrollment, starting the first Monday in
February and ending the third Friday following the first Monday in
96
February. However, the application window was expanded to three
months under 2011 Wisconsin Act 114, and parents are now eligible to
apply from the first Monday in February until the last weekday in
97
April. Additionally, applications may be submitted to a maximum of
91. Id.
92. See Vincent, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 72; see also supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
93. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982).
94. Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 510, 436 N.W.2d 568, 585 (1989) (“Such demands
cannot be remedied by claims of constitutional discrepancies, but rather must be made to the
legislature and, perhaps, also to the community.”).
95. See 2011 Wis. Act 114.
96. Memorandum from Mary Jo Cleaver, Open Enrollment Consultant, to District
Administrators and Open Enrollment Coordinators (Feb. 2, 2012), available at
sms.dpi.wi.gov/files/sms/doc/oe_mmo_extended_ap_2012_02_02.doc.
97. TONY EVERS, INITIAL PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING 2011 WISCONSIN ACT
114* EXCEPTIONS TO THE PUBLIC SCHOOL OPEN ENROLLMENT APPLICATION PERIOD 8
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three nonresident school districts during an academic year.
The
challenges for school administrators created by this expanded
application window are detailed below throughout Part III.
The 2011 amendments also created seven exceptions to the regular
application period that permit parents to apply for open enrollment at
any time during the year, if the student falls into one of the enumerated
99
categories. A parent is now eligible to apply to no more than three
nonresident schools for open enrollment outside of the application
100
window if :
1. The resident school board determines that the pupil has been
the victim of a violent criminal offense, as defined by the
101
department by rule.
2. The pupil is or has been a homeless pupil in the current or
immediately preceding school year. . . .
3. The pupil has been the victim of repeated bullying or
harassment . . . .
4. The place of residence of the pupil’s parent or guardian and of
the pupil has changed as a result of military orders. . . .
5. The pupil moved into this state. . . .
6. The place of residence of the pupil has changed as a result of a
court order or custody agreement or because the pupil was
placed in a foster home or with a person other than the pupil’s
parent, or removed from a foster home or from the home of a
person other than the pupil’s parent. . . .
7. The parent of the pupil, the resident school board, and the
nonresident school board agree that attending school in the
102
nonresident school district is in the best interests of the pupil.

(2012) [hereinafter DPI INITIAL PROCEDURES], available at http://www.k12.com/sites/default
/files/pdf/school-docs/OE-FAQ-Act-114.pdf.
98. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(3)(a)(1) (2011–2012).
99. DPI INITIAL PROCEDURES, supra note 97, at 1–2.
100. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(3m)(a).
101. If the student has been a victim of a violent crime, the resident district may not
deny an application due to undue financial burden. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION,
FULL-TIME INTER-DISTRICT PUBLIC SCHOOL OPEN ENROLLMENT IN WISCONSIN 76 (2012)
[hereinafter DPI OPEN ENROLLMENT OVERVIEW 2012–2013], available at sms.dpi.wi.gov/
files/sms/ppt/oe_overview_2013-14.ppt.
102. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(3m)(b)(1)–(7) (emphasis added).
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In evaluating open enrollment applications under the regular and
alternative application period, a nonresident school district may
103
consider space availability, whether the student has been expelled
from any school in the past two years, whether the student is habitually
truant, and whether a student’s necessary special education services are
104
available.
The 2011 amendment also requires a district to make a
space availability determination eight months prior to the start of the
105
academic year, at the January school board meeting. Districts are no
longer able to consider racial balance as a factor in rejecting or
approving an application to transfer in or out of a school district
following a 2007 Attorney General Opinion that Wisconsin Statute
106
Section 118.51(7) is unconstitutional.
Subsequent to the 2007
Attorney General Opinion, a class action lawsuit—filed by Madison
students whose applications were denied because departure from the
school would have increased racial imbalance—led all Wisconsin schools
107
to remove race as a factor in the open enrollment application process.
Moreover, if the resident school district denies transfer, the parent is
108
entitled to appeal the decision to the DPI. The resident school district
must then respond to the DPI and defend the decision to deny the
109
student’s transfer.
If the DPI determines the transfer is in the
110
However,
student’s best interest, the decision will be overturned.
students may begin attending the nonresident school district before the
open enrollment application has been approved or denied due to the
timing of the application and appeals process, which takes an

103. See infra Part III.C for a detailed discussion on space availability determinations.
104. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(5)(a); see also infra Part III.F for more discussion on special
education students.
105. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(5)(a)(1); WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS ABOUT FULL-TIME INTER-DISTRICT PUBLIC SCHOOL OPEN ENROLLMENT 12
QUESTIONS
AND
ANSWERS],
available
at
(2012)
[hereinafter
DPI
http://dpi.wi.gov/sms/psctoc.html at 12.
106. Letter from J.B. Van Hollen, Wis. Att’y Gen., to Anthony Evers, Deputy State
Superintendent, at 1 (Dec. 20, 2007); N.N. v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 670 F. Supp. 2d 927,
931 (W.D. Wis. 2009).
107. Tony Galli, Madison School District Settles Open Enrollment Lawsuit,
WKOW.COM (June 1, 2011, 6:48 PM), http://www.wkow.com/story/14823272/madison-schooldistrict-settles-open-enrollment-lawsuit (noting that the Madison school district ultimately
settled the case for $90,000); see also N.N., 670 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
108. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(9); WIS. ADMIN. CODE PI § 36.10(2)(a) (Sept. 2012).
109. See DPI QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 105, at 12.
110. Id. at 23–24.
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undetermined amount of time depending on the situation.
If the
denial is ultimately upheld by the DPI, the district superintendent must
112
then force the student to return to the resident district mid-year.
Further, the DPI’s decision may be appealed to the circuit court within
thirty days of the decision, prolonging the student’s undetermined
113
status, and, potentially, attendance at a nonresident district.
Other amendments to the Wisconsin Open Enrollment Program
were made in 2011, such as the ability for a school board to create
114
waiting lists as well as minor school aid adjustments.
However, this
Comment is limited to those provisions with significant implications for
Wisconsin families as well as those amendments that pose barriers to the
effective operations of local school districts, such as the new best
interest of the pupil standard.
B. The Best Interest Standard
The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that “[t]he history of education
since the Industrial Revolution shows a continual struggle between two
forces; the desire by members of society to have educational
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each family to provide the
115
best education it can afford for its own children.” The clash of these
two forces is aptly demonstrated by the new “best interest” exception to
Wisconsin’s application period for inter-district open enrollment. The

111. Id. at 23 (“The length of time it takes to decide an appeal depends on when the
appeal was received, how long it takes to compile the record of the decision, whether the
parties file briefs and responses, how many appeals the department receives, and how
complicated the issues are in the appeal. Most decisions are made and orders mailed during
the month of August.”); see also DPI INITIAL PROCEDURES, supra note 97, at 8. The memo
noted that:
Given the timing of the application procedures, it is very possible that students may
begin attending the nonresident school district before the resident school district has
acted on the application.
. . . If the resident school district denied the application because it does not
believe the transfer is in the best interests of the student, the student may continue
to attend the nonresident school district pending the outcome of the appeal.
Id.
112. DPI INITIAL PROCEDURES, supra note 97, at 8.
113. WIS. ADMIN. CODE PI § 36.10(4)(b); WIS. STAT. § 227.53.
114. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(5)(d)(1); Memorandum from Anne Sappenfield, supra note 16.
115. Busé v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 571, 247 N.W.2d 141, 151 (1976) (quoting James S.
Coleman, Forward to JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION,
at vii (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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first six exceptions to the open enrollment application period provide
specific circumstances that are not likely to be the cause of substantial
116
controversy.
In fact, some of the exceptions are quite practical (i.e.,
117
for students who move into the state ) and other exceptions may be
useful to give students a fresh start at a new school system, particularly
118
in the case of students that are bullied or harassed.
However, the
seventh exception provides a vague and undefined option for district
transfer when the parent(s), the resident district superintendent, and the
nonresident district superintendent agree that the transfer is in the “best
119
interests of the pupil.”
The legislature failed to define standards by which the “best interests
of the pupil” is to be measured and, consequently, the exception
effectively permits year-round open enrollment at the discretion of
individual families, assuming the parent complies with the application
120
procedures and there is space available. Initially, the DPI provided a
cyclical and unhelpful definition, noting that, “[a] transfer is in the best
interests of the student if the parent and nonresident school district
agree and the resident school district does not disagree that the transfer
121
is in the student’s best interest.” A more recent publication from the
DPI notes that when reviewing the best interest exception, the initial
assumption is that the “[p]arent is [the] best judge of the pupil’s
122
interests.”
Additionally, “[a] nonresident or resident school district
may only deny if the district has sufficient reason to overcome the
parent’s judgment” that the transfer is not in the student’s best
123
interest.
However, most superintendents expected to make a best
interest determination have never even met the student, much less are
able to adequately address the considerations necessary to deem a
124
certain placement in the best interest of a student.
116. See WIS. STAT. § 118.51(3m).
117. Id. § 118.51(3m)(b)(5).
118. Id. § 118.51(3m)(b)(3).
119. Id. § 118.51(3m)(b)(7).
120. See DPI OPEN ENROLLMENT OVERVIEW 2012–2013, supra note 101, at 75.
121. DPI INITIAL PROCEDURES, supra note 97, at 11.
122. DPI OPEN ENROLLMENT OVERVIEW 2012–2013, supra note 101, at 75.
123. Id.
124. Even in a small town, such as Plymouth, Wisconsin, with a total population of
roughly 8,000, Superintendent Clark Reinke indicated that he and his colleagues are not sure
how to make best interest determinations when they have never personally met the students.
Telephone interview with Dr. Clark Reinke, Former Superintendent, Plymouth School
District (Oct. 22, 2012).
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As a result, if a child does not meet the first six exceptions, there is
no guidance on what may be factored into the best interest
consideration. Perhaps standards will be developed through a case-bycase analysis during the appeal process, or administrative rules will be
125
promulgated. However, the DPI is currently left with few options but
to defer to the parent’s judgment, which may not always be forthcoming.
For example, the Nebraska legislature recently removed a requirement
for parents to include in the application the reason for the student’s
desire to transfer to another district after “the realization that parents
126
are not always truthful about” the reasons for district transfer.
Without sufficiently defined standards, it is likely that extracurricular
activities, parent dissatisfaction, and general convenience will continue
to play a significant role in parents’ determinations of the best interests
127
of their children.
For now, the vague and undefined best interest standard within the
128
context of public education appears ripe for litigation. Similar to the
lawsuit filed by disgruntled students denied transfer based on a statutory
provision regarding racial balance, it is only a matter of time before
students denied transfer under the best interest exception also appeal
129
the decision to the courts. Yet the exception establishes a seemingly
impossible standard for the district to rebut, despite financial and

125. See DPI INITIAL PROCEDURES, supra note 97, at 12. In the initial memo relating to
the 2011 amendments, the DPI noted:
DPI will review the facts and arguments submitted by the parents and the
resident school district and make a decision about whether the transfer is in the best
interests of the student.
The DPI will not consider any factors that are not related to the best interests
of the student. That is, DPI will not consider the financial effect on the resident
school district or any other factors, except as they relate to the best interests of the
student.
The DPI’s decision is final.
Id.
126. Smith, supra note 20, at 278 (noting reasons that parents do not disclose
motivations behind relocation, such as racial motivations).
127. See supra Part II.C (discussing reasons why parents choose particular school
districts, including higher test scores and extracurricular activities).
128. The author is unaware of any filed or pending lawsuits to date. See infra note 232
and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing the 2007 class action lawsuit
based on the denial of open enrollment transfer applications).
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130

logistical impediments to local control.
Moreover, the “amorphous”
nature of the best interest standard places a judge in the difficult
situation to provide substance to the fluid, “inherently arbitrary,” and
indeterminate standard when decisions are inevitably appealed to the
131
circuit courts. Until greater clarity is provided, the decision appears to
132
rest largely in the hands of dissatisfied parents.
C. Space Availability Determinations
Another challenge enhanced by the 2011 amendments relates to the
school district’s requirement to make a space availability determination.
Under Wisconsin law, school boards are only required to accept
nonresident students if there is space available, in addition to a few
133
other considerations. However, in light of the dramatic expansion of
the Wisconsin’s Open Enrollment Program, a space availability
determination is now required in January of each year, a full eight
134
months prior to the start of the following academic year.
Concerns
and questions among school districts are widespread. How can a district
effectively plan eight months in advance when students can leave at any
135
time throughout the year?
Also, what happens if the January
136
projections are wrong? The DPI indicates that if a nonresident school
district accepts a student and later discovers a lack of space availability,
137
the district cannot rescind the offer.
Thus, the DPI gives significant
138
The DPI
consideration to the newly required January projections.
grants a narrow exception to districts for students with an individualized

130. See infra Part III.C–D.
131. See Lynn M. Akre, Comment, Struggling with Indeterminacy: A Call for
Interdisciplinary Collaboration in Redefining the “Best Interest of the Child” Standard, 75
MARQ. L. REV. 628, 670–71 (1992) (“It is the judges who are the most deeply enmeshed in
the problem who carry the heaviest responsibility on their shoulders and are forced to
continually struggle to find meaning in the amorphous ‘best interest of the child’ standard.”).
132. See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV (providing
recommendations to repeal the best interest exception, or, alternatively, to provide standards
by which to evaluate a best interest determination).
133. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(5)(a)(1) (2011–2012); see also supra note 103 and
accompanying text.
134. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 165–67 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 165–67 and accompanying text.
137. DPI QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 105, at 13 (“Once a student is
approved for open enrollment, that student must be permitted to open enroll.”).
138. See id. at 12.
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139

education program (IEP) that is created or altered after the student
140
enrolls in the nonresident district.
The school district is permitted to take into consideration several
factors in determining space availability, including class size limits,
141
student-teacher ratios, and enrollment projections.
However, the
space determination cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable and the district
must be able to provide a reasonable justification for an applicant’s
142
denial based on space availability.
In McMorrow v. Benson, the
Whitefish Bay School District denied the plaintiff’s application for open
enrollment for lack of space availability but accepted the applications of
143
three continuing students that were already enrolled in the school.
The circuit court held that the decision to accept continuing students
144
despite an expressed concern for space availability was arbitrary. The
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court and found that the continuing
student provision that permits nonresident districts to guarantee
approval to currently attending students “applies only when there are
145
spaces available in the first place.” However, “when there are more
applicants than spaces available, the pupils accepted shall be determined
on a random basis” even if certain students are currently attending the
146
district.
In light of the 2011 amendments to open enrollment, it is possible
that the circuit court decision would come out differently because the
decision operated against the best interest of the continuing students,
who were required to transfer districts in the middle of the academic
year. Thus, school districts must now re-evaluate the little Wisconsin
case law that provides substantive guidance on space availability
determinations, while making difficult projections in the midst of yearround open enrollment transfers.

139. An Individualized Education Program (IEP) is a written statement for each child
with a disability that includes a statement of the child’s present level of academic
achievement, measurable annual goals, a description of the child’s progress toward meeting
the goals, as well as other federal requirements. 34 C.F.R. § 300.320 (2012).
140. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(12)(a) (2011–2012).
141. McMorrow v. Benson, 2000 WI App 173, ¶ 13, 238 Wis. 2d 329, 617 N.W.2d 247
(citing WIS. STAT. § 118.51(5)(a)).
142. Id. ¶ 10.
143. Id. ¶ 11.
144. Id. ¶ 6.
145. Id. ¶ 16 (emphasis omitted).
146. Id. (emphasis omitted).

MALUGADE FINAL (6-30-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

836

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/2/2014 5:23 PM

[97:3

D. Financial Implications
In addition to logistical considerations such as the space availability
determination, the expansion of open enrollment impacts local district
finances. Although public school financing is not explicitly addressed by
the open enrollment amendments, the loss of students significantly
147
impacts a school district’s budget through the loss of per-pupil funding.
The districts that lose a substantial number of students through open
enrollment transfers “have fewer dollars to spend on the students
remaining, and the operation of those districts will become less uniform,
148
thorough, and efficient.” Districts suffering from the sustained loss of
financial resources are then forced to eliminate many attractive aspects
of a well-rounded public school, such as physical education, art, music,
149
journalism, advanced placement courses, and field trips.
Thus, the
financial implications of the recent amendments impact all families with
students in the public school system, especially those that remain in the
“losing” districts that enter into a “downward and accelerating ‘spiral of
150
decline.’”
Under the Wisconsin’s Open Enrollment Program, families do not
151
pay for the cost of attending a nonresident district. Rather, the DPI
transfers aid from the resident to the nonresident school on a prorated
152
153
basis, although an exception exists for special education students.
The amount transferred per student is “equal to the statewide average
per pupil school district cost for regular instruction, co-curricular
activities, instructional support services and pupil support services in the
147. School districts derive most of their revenue through state aid—which is based on
the districts per pupil value of taxable property—and local property taxes. RUSS KAVA &
LAYLA MERRIFIELD, WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, STATE AID TO SCHOOL
DISTRICTS 1, 3 (2013), available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/InformationalPapers/Documents/2013/24_State%20Aid%20to%20School%20Districts.pdf (noting that in
2010–2011 over 87% of district revenue came from state aid and property taxes); see also WIS.
STAT. § 118.51(16) (2011–2012).
148. McGillivray, supra note 32, at 129.
149. Jimerson, supra note 15, at 18.
150. Id. (quoting Kenneth Howe et al., School Choice Crucible: A Case Study of Boulder
Valley, 83 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 137, 144 (2001)).
151. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(16); see also LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU ON OPEN
ENROLLMENT, supra note 11, at 4.
152. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(16)(c); see also LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU ON OPEN
ENROLLMENT, supra note 11, at 7.
153. The resident school district pays the nonresident district directly for a special
education student. See WIS. STAT. § 118.51(17); Doe v. Wis. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, No.
03-CV-892, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 2004).

MALUGADE FINAL (6-30-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

OPEN ENROLLMENT

7/2/2014 5:23 PM

837

154

previous school year.” By looking to aggregate state data, proponents
155
of open enrollment minimize the financial impacts. At the statewide
level, only 4.4% of the student population in Wisconsin participated in
156
However, a
open enrollment in the 2011–2012 academic year.
microlevel analysis at the district level indicates that over 50% of
Wisconsin school districts suffered a net loss of students, which includes
157
a loss in state aid. For the 2011–2012 academic year, the total amount
158
transferred per student using open enrollment was $6,867, and out of
424 districts, 224 had a net loss of students and 199 had a net gain in the
159
2010–2011 academic year.
A 2011 legislative audit report on open enrollment indicates that
those districts with a net gain of students had higher property taxes than
160
those districts with a net loss.
As a result, the transfer of students
through open enrollment disproportionally impacts districts with lower
property taxes by taking roughly $7,000 for each student out of the
161
district without regard to certain fixed costs. Although a percentage
cap on transfers out of a resident school district was initially authorized,
the law no longer permits a denial of an open enrollment application
under the percentage cap or based on an undue financial burden, as it
162
did prior to and during the 2005–2006 academic year.
Therefore, a
resident district cannot deny a student the opportunity to transfer to a
nonresident district solely because of the financial burden imposed by
163
the aggregate loss of students to neighboring districts.
Moreover,
154. DPI QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 105, at 30; see also WIS. STAT.
§ 118.51(16)(a).
155. Jimerson, supra note 15, at 18.
156. RUSS KAVA, WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, OPEN ENROLLMENT
PROGRAM: INFORMATIONAL PAPER 27, at 10 (2013), available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lf
b/publications/Informational-Papers/Documents/2013/27_Open%20Enrollment%20Program.
pdf.
157. Id. at app. 15–24; LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU ON OPEN ENROLLMENT, supra
note 11, at 4.
158. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, OPEN ENROLLMENT AT A GLANCE:
STATEWIDE DATA (2012), available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/files/sms/pdf/oe_psoe_at_a_glanc
e.pdf; see also WIS. STAT. § 118.51(16)(a).
159. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU ON OPEN ENROLLMENT, supra note 11, at 7.
160. Id. The receiving districts tend to be smaller, have higher direct educational costs
per student, and receive less equalization aid. Id.
161. Id. at 6–7.
162. Sch. Dist. of Stockbridge v. Evers, 2010 WI App 144, ¶ 1, 330 Wis. 2d 80, 792
N.W.2d 615 (interpreting WIS. STAT. § 118.51(6) (2007–08)).
163. See id.
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districts are not permitted to increase property taxes to offset any loss of
state aid resulting from open enrollment transfers and are without
164
recourse to compensate for the lost funding.
In fact, the extended application period has created “a budgeting
nightmare for districts working on financial forecasts” for the upcoming
165
year.
During the same period where students apply for open
enrollment transfers, school districts are required to make space
availability determinations, set budgets, estimate enrollment, and
166
anticipate staff needs for the following school year. In Racine, district
leaders attempted to plan for the 2011–2012 school year with an
167
anticipated $4.35 million revenue loss resulting from open enrollment.
Similarly, open enrollment created “more losers than winners” in
Kenosha County where only five of the twelve public school districts
168
gained more students than it lost in the 2010–2012 school years.
School administrator David Milz noted that for the Salem school
system, open enrollment “represent[s] a huge financial loss of nearly $1
169
million from [the] budget, money that cannot be recovered.” For the
164. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU ON OPEN ENROLLMENT, supra note 11, at 5.
165. Dorothy Jasperson-Robson, Open Enrollment Extension Presents Budgeting Delays
for School Districts, WESTBY TIMES (Feb. 15, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://lacrossetribune.com/west
bytimes/news/local/open-enrollment-extension-presents-budgeting-delays-for-school-distri
cts/article_b6692c12-57f3-11e1-aac0-0019bb2963f4.html; Morgan Smith, Weighing Options for
Expanding School Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2012, at A27A.
166. Jasperson-Robson, supra note 165. The Westby Times reported:
Charles Norton, the Westby Area School District Administrator, said each year as
school districts prepare the budget for the upcoming school year, the first and most
challenging decision made is to forecast the number of students enrolled by
building/grade and the overall district, and those numbers are used to estimate the
potential level of state aid, as well as class sizes and the number of staff required to
fill their educational needs.
“Without this key piece of the puzzle, the process simply cannot begin in
earnest. Pushing the open enrollment deadline back to April 30 will certainly have
an impact on our ability to forecast final student counts thereby making it even
more difficult to finalize a budget and the related staff counts required to meet
student need,” Norton said.
Id.
167. Melinda Tichelaar, Racine Unified School District Budget Impacted by Declining
Enrollment, CALEDONIA PATCH (Aug. 15, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://caledonia.patch.com/articles
/racine-unified-school-district-budget-impacted-by-declining-enrollment.
168. Jill Tatge-Rozell, County Schools Raked by Open Enrollment: Only Five of 12
Local Districts Gaining Students; Millions in Aid Changing Hands, KENOSHA NEWS (Feb. 7,
2011, 1:16 AM) (on file with author).
169. Id.
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districts that receive more students than they lose, the open enrollment
program is considered a means to combat budget shortfalls, but in the
end it serves to only intensify the already stark wealth disparity between
170
school districts.
The financial implications of open enrollment are not unique to
171
172
173
Wisconsin. In fact, Ohio, Minnesota, and Texas also report that
174
open enrollment poses significant constraints to district funding.
In
Ohio, the financial implications are even greater when a district opts not
to participate in open enrollment because even though a district can
choose to not accept incoming transfer students, it cannot refuse to
175
permit resident students to transfer out. Although a full discussion of
school finance litigation is beyond the scope of this Comment, public
school finances impact all students and families, particularly those in the
176
50% of districts with dwindling state funding each year.
The fiscal
uncertainty experienced by these districts is only compounded by the
year-round statutory exceptions to the open enrollment application
period, which also provides a new pool of potential students to funnel
toward virtual charter schools.
170. In Wauwatosa, the district intended to “patch an anticipated $1.6 million budget
shortfall” by admitting an additional 270 open enrollment students in the 2009–2010 academic
year. See More Open Enrollment Students Could Solve District’s Budget Gap, WAUWATOSA
NOW (May 28, 2009), http://www.wauwatosanow.com/news/46360947.html.
171. Richard Jones, Open Enrollment Hurts Some Schools in Funding, OXFORD PRESS
(Oxford, Ohio) (Jan. 6, 2012, 10:35 PM), http://www.oxfordpress.com/news/news/local/openenrollment-hurts-some-schools-in-funding/nNYd6/ (noting that although some schools recoup
a significant portion of lost funds through incoming student transfers, others fall far short; for
example, the Middletown school system lost more than $1.8 million in funding but only
gained a little over $323,000 through new students enrolled in the district); see also Open
Enrollment Helps, Hurts School Districts, STAR BEACON (Ashtabula, Ohio) (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://starbeacon.com/local/x553406727/Open-enrollment-helps-hurts-school-districts (noting
that the open enrollment program “play[s] havoc with the per-pupil funding that follows each
child”).
172. Mascia, supra note 49, at 462–63 & n.241 (citing Interview with Willard K. Baker,
Executive Director, Minnesota School Board, in Connie Leslie et al., Giving Parents a
Choice, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 1988, at 78).
173. Morgan Smith, Some Texas Districts Pursuing School Choice Locally, TEXAS
TRIBUNE (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.texastribune.org/2012/12/14/some-texas-districtspursuing-school-choice-locall/ (quoting Michael Zolkosi, Ysleta Independent School District
Superintendent, who noted that open enrollment “hurts districts in the planning for facilities,
salaries for teachers, [and] building locations for students” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
174. Mascia, supra note 49, at 463–64.
175. See Open Enrollment Helps, Hurts School Districts, supra note 171.
176. See LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU ON OPEN ENROLLMENT, supra note 11, at 7.
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E. The Rise of Virtual Charter Schools in Wisconsin
Another factor accelerating the loss of financial support from public
schools in Wisconsin is the rise of the for-profit virtual education
industry, which was a key lobbying force behind the 2011 amendments
177
and has since significantly benefitted.
Virtual charter schools are
publicly funded schools that operate independently of many state
regulations applied to traditional public schools yet are eligible for the
178
same state aid per pupil.
Students attend school from home and
179
communicate with teachers virtually, largely through online forums.
While the tremendous increase in students opting out of their resident
district seems to support the argument to do away with the residentialbased education model, the Supreme Court upheld the legitimacy of
180
state residency requirements in Martinez v. Bynum.
Nonetheless,
residency requirements are increasingly challenged as antiquated and
irrelevant in the twenty-first century due to increased global mobility
181
and the proliferation of virtual charter schools.
Although the
residential-based public education system is alive and well today, the
expansion of the open enrollment program as well as the removal of a
virtual school enrollment cap has paved the way for the continued
182
expansion of virtual schools.
Interestingly, the virtual education industry in Wisconsin was one of
the primary lobbyists behind the 2011 legislative expansion of open

177. Eric Oliver, Half of Virtual Charter Schools Judged in New Report Cards Miss
Mark, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 28, 2013, at 9A.
178. PAUL STUIBER ET AL., WIS. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, AN EVALUATION:
VIRTUAL CHARTER SCHOOLS 3–4 (2010), available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/
10-3full.pdf; Oliver, supra note 177 (“Like other charter schools, virtual charter schools are
eligible for $7,775 annually in state aid per pupil.”).
179. STUIBER ET AL., supra note 178, at 19–20.
180. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1983).
Bona fide residency
requirements—as opposed to durational residency requirements that condition a benefit on a
minimum period of residence within a particular jurisdiction—are generally upheld as they
further a substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are
enjoyed by its residents. Id. at 325.
181. See Sarah L. Browning, Will Residency Be Relevant to Public Education in the
Twenty-First Century?, 8 PIERCE L. REV. 297, 338–44 (2010).
182. See Eric Litke, Virtual School Enrollment Jumps 38 Percent, SHEBOYGAN PRESS
(Oct. 21, 2012), http://www.sheboyganpress.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/201210191636/S
HE019802/310190372; see also Erin Richards & Jennifer Zahn, Many Districts Losing
Students: But Some Online Charter Schools Report Hefty Gains, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
October 15, 2012, at 1A.
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183

enrollment in Wisconsin.
According to the Wisconsin Government
Accountability Board, virtual education organizations—including K12
Inc., Insight Schools, and the Wisconsin Coalition of Virtual School
Families—spent a significant amount of time and resources advocating
184
on behalf of the open enrollment amendments.
During the Senate
Committee on Education hearings on Senate Bill 2, the Wisconsin
Coalition for Virtual School Families gave the only public testimony in
support of the proposed legislation, aside from the DPI and the
185
Wisconsin Association of School Boards.
Significantly, K12 Inc.,
which is headquartered in Virginia but operates in Wisconsin and
nationwide, spent nearly $26.5 million on advertising in 2010 yet only
one third of its students achieved Adequate Yearly Progress, a threshold
measurement defined by the No Child Left Behind Act to assess
186
students’ progress on standardized tests.
Wisconsin State Superintendent, Tony Evers, and the former chair
of the Senate Committee on Education and Corrections, John Lehman,
have both expressed distaste with this consequence of the expansion of
187
open enrollment.
Superintendent Evers recently commented that,
“[o]ne of the concerns I do have is that the virtual school law is
relatively permissive, and we have some schools popping up around the
state that frankly look more like resource centers for home school kids
188
than they do schools.”
Further, Senator John Lehman noted
discomfort with the state assuming financial responsibility for home
189
The DPI has little
school families using virtual education programs.
183. See Eye on Lobbying: Senate Bill 2, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD,
https://lobbying.wi.gov/What/BillInformation/2011REG/Information/7918 (last visited Dec.
28, 2013); see also Memorandum from Rose Fernandez, Wisconsin Coalition of Virtual
School Families, to Assembly Republicans (Apr. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.wivirtualschoolfamilies.org/alerts/memo-on-sb2/.
184. See Eye on Lobbying: Senate Bill 2, supra note 183.
185. Senate Committee on Education Public Hearing, WISCONSINEYE at 16:40–38:35
(Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?evhdid
=3582. Representatives from the Wisconsin Coalition of Virtual School Families testified that
the proposed expansion of open enrollment was necessary, but not sufficient, and that the bill
is only the beginning of an effort to erode the traditional, residentially based public school
system. Id.
186. Stephanie Saul, Profits and Questions at Online Charter Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
13, 2011, at A1; No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1111(b)(2), 115 Stat. 1445–
46 (2001) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2012)).
187. Litke, supra note 182.
188. Id.
189. Id.

MALUGADE FINAL (6-30-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

842

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/2/2014 5:23 PM

[97:3

oversight over virtual schools, online students are exempt from daily
attendance laws, and the DPI does not track daily attendance or have an
190
alternative system in place to ensure regular attendance.
Although the DPI recently announced plans for an in-depth study of
191
virtual schools during the 2012–2013 school year, no study was planned
until a media investigation revealed “significant achievement gaps
between students” attending virtual charter schools and those attending
192
traditional public schools. The investigation reported that students in
virtual schools “struggle to finish high school in four years, repeat grades
five times as frequently and last year trailed their counterparts in every
subject but reading on the annual Wisconsin Student Assessment
193
System test.”
As one Wisconsin superintendent argued in a brief to
the DPI supporting the denial of a student’s transfer request, “[w]ith 39
years of experience as a professional educator, a doctorate degree in
education, [and] 13 years as Superintendent of the Plymouth School
District . . . . I cannot in good conscience agree that enrollment in a
194
virtual school is in the best educational interests of this student.” The
most recent report card issued by the DPI found that half of the virtual
195
schools assessed did not meet state performance expectations.
Not only have the schools failed to perform academically, but the
rise of virtual education has also negatively impacted public school
finances. A 2010 legislative audit recognized that school districts suffer
a financial loss when students not previously enrolled in the district
attend virtual schools through open enrollment because few schools lose
196
enough students to reduce fixed costs. Although the drafting record
for 2011 Wisconsin Act 114 indicated no projected change in the state
budget, an impact in the local budget was predicted if students who are
currently home schooled chose to attend a nonresident school district by
190. Eric Litke, DPI Planning “In-Depth” Study of Virtual Schools, SHEBOYGAN
PRESS (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.sheboyganpress.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/201210181
312/SHE019802/310180373 [hereinafter DPI Planning “In-Depth” Study of Virtual Schools];
see also STUIBER ET AL., supra note 178, at 19–21.
191. DPI Planning “In-Depth” Study of Virtual Schools, supra note 190.
Recommendations for this study were made by the state’s nonpartisan Legislative Audit
Bureau in a report issued in February 2010. See STUIBER ET AL., supra note 178, at 7.
192. DPI Planning “In-Depth” Study of Virtual Schools, supra note 190.
193. Id.
194. See Letter from Clark Reinke, Superintendent, to Jennifer Danfield, Open
Enrollment Consultant (Sept. 6, 2012) (on file with author).
195. Oliver, supra note 177.
196. Id.
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197

using open enrollment. In a very short time, that prediction has come
true. Home-school students are now enrolling in virtual schools, at the
taxpayer’s expense, when they never attended the public school and the
198
district did not initially receive funding for the student.
One school administrator at a virtual school in Merril, Wisconsin
noted that about 80% of the school’s 460 students are former home199
school students who were never enrolled in the public school system.
These school districts not only lose expected funding from their
projected budget when existing students leave, but they also have to
account for unexpected funds when a previously home-schooled student
200
now wants to attend a virtual school.
In an effort to mitigate this
challenge, administrative regulations require an applicant to register in
201
the resident district prior to beginning open enrollment.
However,
increasing use of the best interest standard ensures that students will be
transferring throughout the year, leaving district budgets in constant
202
fluctuation. Assuming financial responsibility for Wisconsin students
to attend these “relatively permissive . . . resource centers” that have
failed to meet minimum performance expectations does not appear to
203
serve the best interest of Wisconsin students and families.
F. Students with Disabilities: The Undue Financial Burden Standard
While open enrollment is increasingly accessible to the majority of
the population, students with disabilities face additional hurdles and are

197. See DONALD SMITH, WIS. DEP’T OF ADMIN., FISCAL ESTIMATE-2011 SESSION 2
(2011), available at http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/related/fe/sb2/sb2_DPI.pdf.
198. Litke, supra note 182. The same is true with recent expansion of the private school
choice program in Racine and various other cities in Wisconsin. Erin Richards & Patrick
Simonaitis, Most Students Applying for State Voucher Program Attend Private Schools,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/news/education/moststudents-applying-for-state-voucher-program-attend-private-schools-b9976473z1-219789131.h
tml. In fact, 67% of students who participated in the new and limited Wisconsin state
voucher program “were already attending a private school last year without the help of
taxpayer dollars.” Id.
199. Litke, supra note 182.
200. In addition, public schools are unable to compete with the marketing funds
available to the for-profit virtual school programs. Id.
201. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE § PI 36.03(1)(f), (3)(d) (Sept. 2012).
202. See supra notes 165–70 and accompanying text (discussing the financial and
budgeting “nightmare” caused by the open enrollment amendments).
203. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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more likely to be denied participation than non-disabled students.
During the 2012–2013 academic year, special education student
applications were denied roughly 42% of the time, as opposed to a 32%
205
denial rate for general education students.
Open enrollment costs for students with disabilities are paid by the
resident school district directly to the nonresident district, unlike
206
students without disabilities where the DPI transfers funds directly.
The nonresident school district bills the standard transfer amount for
regular education students plus any “actual, additional, special
207
education costs” incurred in educating the student.
Because
nonresident school districts do not shoulder the cost of educating
transfer students with disabilities, the nonresident school district can
only deny enrollment for lack of space availability or if the services
208
required by the IEP are not available. The nonresident school district
is not permitted to deny a student with an IEP based on financial
209
considerations.
However, resident school districts are permitted to
deny an open enrollment request for a student with an IEP if the cost of
the special education imposes an “undue financial burden,” which takes
210
into consideration the school district’s total economic circumstances.

204. See WIS. DEP’T OF INSTRUCTION, OPEN ENROLLMENT APPROVALS AND
DENIALS: SPECIAL EDUCATION AND NOT SPECIAL EDUCATION (2012), available at
http://oe.dpi.wi.gov/files/oe/pdf/multi-yr-sped-participation-data.pdf; Emily Kram, Disabilities
Create Hurdles to Open Enrollment, SUPERIOR TELEGRAM (Sept. 4, 2013),
http://www.superiortelegram.com/content/disabilities-create-hurdles-open-enrollment.
205. WIS. DEP’T OF INSTRUCTION, supra note 204.
206. See Doe v. Wis. Dep’t. of Pub. Instruction, No. 03-CV-892, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Wis.
Dec. 2004).
207. Id. “Actual, additional special education costs” are those costs actually incurred by
the school district that are specific to the student and would not be incurred if the student
were not attending the nonresident school district. Id.
208. WIS. STAT. §§ 118.13(1), 118.51(5)(a)(4) (2011–2012).
209. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(12)(a)–(b), (17); see also Doe, No. 03-CV-892, slip op. at 2
(holding unconstitutional a prior version of the open enrollment statute that permitted open
enrollment tuition for disabled students to exceed tuition for non-disabled students).
210. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(12)(b)(1); Sch. Dist. of Stockbridge v. Evers, 2010 WI App 144,
¶ 11, 330 Wis. 2d 80, 792 N.W.2d 615 (holding that a resident school district is permitted to
deny a transfer application to a nonresident school district based on the costs to implement a
student’s IEP). An “undue financial burden” is determined “in light of the resident school
district’s total economic circumstances, including its revenue limit . . . , its ability to pay tuition
costs for the pupil, and the per pupil special education or related services costs for children
with disabilities continuing to be served by the resident school district.” WIS. STAT.
§ 118.51(12)(b)(1).
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The DPI recently shed some light on the “undue financial burden”
standard by overturning the Rice Lake School Board’s denial of an open
211
enrollment transfer for a disabled student in 2010.
Since 2009, the
Rice Lake School District had reduced its operating budget by over
$680,000 due to declining enrollment largely attributed to open
212
enrollment.
In order to accommodate the transfer request for a
student with exceptional needs, the resident district (Rice Lake) was
required to fund a duplicate program already running with a cost of
roughly $80,000 for occupational and physical therapy costs as well as
213
special education and related services.
Even though the resident
district already had a program to serve the student’s needs, the DPI held
that “the statute does not permit a district to deny because the tuition
214
cost is a financial burden; the financial burden must be ‘undue.’”
Despite this recent decision, the contours of what constitutes an
215
undue financial burden remain relatively unclear.
Nonetheless,
disabled students may be denied transfer to a nonresident school district
based on an undue financial burden while their non-disabled
216
counterparts may not.
Although such regulation is likely due to
competing public policy concerns, the end result leaves school districts
in a fiscal nightmare while depriving disabled students of equal access to
participate in open enrollment.
G. Other Equitable Concerns
In addition to the disparate treatment for disabled students and
financial disparities between school districts, open enrollment raises
other equitable concerns that primarily face low-income families and
students. Traditionally, equitable arguments center on the barriers for
low-income families that do not have the ability to transport their

211. School Disputes Student Transfer, CHRONOTYPE (Rice Lake, WI) (Sept. 9, 2010),
http://www.ricelakeonline.com/main.asp?SectionID=25&subsectionID=84&articleID=20365.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. (quoting the DPI decision regarding the Rice Lake transfer denial).
215. In addition, the financial burden on the resident school district is compounded by
the responsibility to provide transportation for students with IEPs that require transportation.
See WIS. STAT. § 118.51(14)(a)(2). In contrast, parents are responsible for transportation to
the nonresident school for non-disabled students. See id. § 118.51(14)(a)(1).
216. See id. § 118.51(12)(b)(1).
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children to a neighboring district or cannot afford transportation costs.
However, Wisconsin has attempted to mitigate this disparity by
providing transportation assistance for low-income parents who are
218
eligible for free or reduced meals under federal guidelines.
Instead, the equitable implications that stem from the recent
amendments to the open enrollment program relate to a lack of
information or misinformation. Low-income and less educated families
tend to have less access to information relating to the quality of school
219
systems. For example, the 2014–2015 DPI Open Enrollment Brochure
states that “[t]he application period closes at 4:00 p.m. on April 30, 2014.
220
Late applications will not be accepted for any reason.” One Wisconsin
news article reported that the application deadlines from February
through April are “firm” and that “early and late applications are not
221
accepted.”
For a parent who is not “in the know,” the emphasized
language that “[l]ate applications will not be accepted for any reason”
seems pretty clear. Unless the parent has sufficient information relating
to the alternative application period, the quoted language above would
likely be the last stop for many Wisconsin parents.
Additionally, studies of the open enrollment programs in Akron,
Omaha, and Des Moines indicated a “glaring underutilization” by
nonwhite students and “a disproportionate number of white students
222
transferring out of the urban district[s].” An Iowa Board of Education
report concluded that nonwhite students did not have sufficient
information about the open enrollment program but would participate if
223
such information was provided.
In addition, studies indicate that
217. See McGillivray, supra note 32, at 120 (“Transportation issues have led to law suits
in other states where low income students have been denied the right to attend a school of
choice because they lacked affordable transportation. When adequate transportation is not
provided, open enrollment merely becomes another program which disadvantaged pupils may
not use.”).
218. WIS. STAT. § 118.51(14)(b).
219. Smith, supra note 20, at 279 (quoting Richard W. Campbell & Lawrence R.
Hepburn, Educational Choice: Is It Really a “Panacea” for What Ails American Schools?, 2
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 70 (1992)); see also VAN DUNK & DICKMAN, supra note 42, at 97
(noting that shopping for schools is not an easy task).
220. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, FULL-TIME INTER-DISTRICT OPEN ENROLLMENT IN WISCONSIN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/files/sms/pdf/OE%
20brochure%202014-15.pdf.
221. Jasperson-Robson, supra note 165.
222. Constance Hawke, The “Choice” For Urban School Districts: Open Enrollment or
Desegregation?, 115 ED. LAW REP. 609, 620 (1997).
223. Id. at 619–20.

MALUGADE FINAL (6-30-14) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

7/2/2014 5:23 PM

OPEN ENROLLMENT

847

“minority parents and parents of lower socioeconomic status have fewer
interactions with individuals who have knowledge about schools” and as
224
a result have less information by which to make a decision.
Thus,
appropriate implementation of an open enrollment program requires
greater efforts to provide sufficient information to parents and students
225
of disadvantaged backgrounds in order to level the playing field.
IV. CURTAILING THE EXPANSION OF OPEN ENROLLMENT BEST
SERVES ALL WISCONSIN STUDENTS
Although this Comment does not advocate the elimination of open
enrollment entirely, it suggests that the recent and continued expansion
of the program undermines the effectiveness of over half of the state
public school districts that suffer from the infusion of the free market
226
into Wisconsin public education.
Unless the expansion of open
enrollment is reined in with sufficient parameters, it will continue to
grow and further compromise the education of those students who
227
remain in the losing districts. Instead, a return to the limited, threeweek application period allows districts sufficient time to plan while
providing parents with an opportunity to participate in the open
enrollment program, as has been the case since its inception in 1998.
Additionally, the legislature should closely evaluate how the expanded
open enrollment application period facilitates the rise of virtual
education and implement strict regulations to ensure performance
expectations are satisfied by virtual schools.
The significant
achievement gaps between virtual schools and traditional public schools
as well as the overall lack of regulation indicates that the proliferating

224. VAN DUNK & DICKMAN, supra note 42, at 97–98 (citing MARK SCHNEIDER ET AL.,
CHOOSING SCHOOLS: CONSUMER CHOICE AND THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS 149
(2000); Jeffrey R. Henig, The Local Dynamics of Choice: Ethnic Preferences and Institutional
Responses, in WHO CHOSES? WHO LOSES? CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE UNEQUAL
EFFECTS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 95, 110 (Bruce Fuller et al. eds., 1996)).
225. Hawke, supra note 222, at 620 (noting “school districts implementing open
enrollment should consider making dissemination of information about open enrollment
options to parents and students a top priority, with the hopes of generating as much interest
as possible in both the white and nonwhite sector”).
226. See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text (noting that 50% of Wisconsin
public school districts lost students and financial support in the 2010–2011 academic year as a
result of open enrollment).
227. See supra note 185 (highlighting that proponents of the 2011 legislative
amendments consider the expansion as “only the beginning”).
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virtual education industry is not currently in the best interest of
228
Wisconsin students and families.
Moreover, the Wisconsin legislature should repeal the statutory best
interest exception to the open enrollment application period in light of
the limited benefit and the significant impediment to local control it
provides. Similar to the best interest of the child standard that has long
229
been applied in the context of family law, the recent inclusion of the
best interest of the pupil standard introduces ambiguity and uncertainty
230
Historically, the best interest
into the realm of public education.
standard has received significant criticism with many arguing that “it is
231
too indeterminate to be helpful in legal decisions.”
Also, the best
interest standard is sure to increase litigation surrounding open
232
enrollment transfers, just as it has done in family law disputes.
Instead, if one of the first six categories that permit an exception to the
application period do not apply, it is reasonable to require the student to
wait until the application period opens for the subsequent year,
particularly in light of the administrative, financial, and logistical
concerns that directly impact the overall efficiency of the public school
233
system. These six exceptions provide greater certainty for all parties
and relatively objective standards to guide student transfer decisions
234
with minor conflict.
228. See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text.
229. Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 43
(2006) (“The ‘best interests of the child’ standard expresses the state’s parens patriae role and
has been widely adopted by state legislatures to guide judges making custodial and other
decisions related to children.”).
230. In contrast, proponents of the best interest standard in other fields of the law see
the standard as providing flexibility and adaptability. Richard A. Warshak, Parenting by the
Clock: The Best-Interest-of-the-Child Standard, Judicial Discretion, and the American Law
Institute’s “Approximation Rule,” 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 83, 98 (2011).
231. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1987); Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care—In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 599, 599 (1973); Rachel M. Colancecco, Note, A Flexible Solution to a Knotty
Problem: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Relocation Disputes, 1 DREXEL L. REV.
573, 604 (2009) (“[T]he best interests of the child standard has generated a substantial amount
of criticism.”).
232. Warshak, supra note 230, at 86 (citing Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A
Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497, 508 (1988)); see also supra notes 128–32 and
accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 165–70 and accompanying text (discussing the financial and
budgeting “nightmare” caused by the open enrollment amendments).
234. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text (listing the statutory exceptions to
the regular open enrollment period).
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In the alternative, a balancing test should be employed by which
school districts, the DPI, and Wisconsin courts might weigh the best
interest of each student against the administrative, financial, and
equitable implications that impact the effective operations of public
schools. In education law, the Supreme Court has developed balancing
tests in several contexts to weigh the interests of the state in providing
235
an efficient public service against the interest of the individual.
However, there must be sufficiently defined parameters. Even where
the best interest standard has been applied in other areas of the law,
courts are guided by factors enumerated in statutes or developed
236
through case law. For example, child custody and physical placement
237
determinations in Wisconsin are guided by sixteen codified factors.
Similarly, guidelines for evaluating an application under the best interest
exception should be developed.
First, the primary motivation for the student’s requested district
transfer should be considered. Factors to consider include, but are not
limited to, whether there is an imminent need for a change in
educational placement, whether the student’s physical or mental wellbeing is compromised, whether the district transfer is primarily for nonacademic purposes (including parent or guardian convenience or
extracurricular activities), whether requiring the student to wait until the
subsequent academic year would significantly impact the ability of the
student to receive a quality education, and the opinion of educational
professionals that have personal knowledge of the student. Of course,
the risk posed by retaining the best interest approach is that parents will
not be forthright about the true reasons for transfer, which is likely to be
238
less than altruistic.
Second, the primary motivation for district transfer must outweigh
the administrative, financial, and equitable implications for school
districts outlined in this Comment. A consideration of the impact on

235. Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (applying a balancing test in the
context of free speech that weighs the right of the individual against the government’s interest
in operating an efficient and effective government service); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) (applying a balancing test in the context of Fourth
Amendment student drug testing).
236. Warshak, supra note 230, at 99; Akre, supra note 131, at 638 (noting that “most
state statutes delineate certain factors to be considered in determining the best interest of the
child”).
237. WIS. STAT. § 767.41(5) (2011–2012).
238. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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public school districts provides a more holistic determination, taking
into account the best interest of all Wisconsin children rather than just
one student. As one commentator argued in opposition to the best
interest standard, “by promoting the interest of [a] child in a particular
239
case, one may work against the interests of children in general.”
Rather than focus on the individual at the expense of the collective,
public schools should consider the cumulative impact of student
240
transfers and the “broader educative effects of the law.” An approach
that balances the interest of the individual student against the interest of
the state is necessary to satisfy the Wisconsin state constitutional
guarantee of a uniform public education for all students.
V. CONCLUSION
Expansion of the Wisconsin Open Enrollment Program obstructs
local control over educational resources and as the United States
Supreme Court stated in Martinez, “[n]o single tradition in public
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of
241
schools.”
Although student transfers based on preferred
extracurricular activities or parental convenience might be in the best
interest of one particular child, this Comment urges policymakers to
look at the bigger picture and consider the best interest of all children as
well as the fundamental purpose of Wisconsin public education.
At the end of the day, a system that pits one public school against
another, thereby creating winning and losing school districts, inequitably
impacts Wisconsin students and families. Further, the expansion of
open enrollment serves to facilitate the largely unregulated and
ineffective virtual education industry. Any attempt to rationalize the
less than optimal education received by students left behind in the losing
districts fails to take into consideration the fundamental state
constitutional guarantee of “[a]n equal opportunity for a sound basic
242
education.” In the end, the best interests of all Wisconsin students are
served by returning to the more limited and controlled inter-district
239. Elster, supra note 231, at 21. Elster argues that “in addition to the interest of the
particular child in any given decision, one must take account of the interests . . . of children in
general.” Id. at 32.
240. Id. at 32.
241. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 329 (1983) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 741 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
242. Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 51, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388 (emphasis
added).
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open enrollment program that existed prior to the 2011 legislative
amendments.
*

LAURA MALUGADE

*

Candidate for J.D., 2014, Marquette University; B.A., 2009, University of Utah. Thank
you to my father, Richard York, for encouraging me to pursue this topic, countless reviews of
earlier drafts, invaluable insights, and passion to strengthen Wisconsin public education.
Thank you to Professor Secunda for providing helpful and constructive criticism to an earlier
draft and Dr. Clark Reinke for providing valuable input from a practical perspective. To the
staff of the Marquette Law Review, your time and efforts did not go unnoticed and are greatly
appreciated. Finally, thank you to my husband, Philip, for his unwavering support in
everything I do. His selfless commitment to teach in under-resourced communities that
desperately deserve equal educational opportunities is truly an inspiration. To the rest of my
family and all of those named above, I am eternally grateful.

